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to make clear its preemptive intent or lack thereof 6 9 When the
Court's own poorly defined doctrine is at issue, the Court should not
require more.70
Kiowa Tribe therefore stands as an example of unjustified inaction
parading in the rhetoric of deference. The Court's interpretive inaction was not warranted; the Court has the unique ability to interpret
its own case law. Despite the Court's defense of deference to a more
qualified branch, its decisional inaction was also unwarranted. Ideally,
Congress soon will legislate a comprehensive, well-balanced resolution
to the complex problem of tribal immunity. Historically, however,
when confronted with a tribal immunity question the Court has not
waited idly for Congress to put the whole of Indian law on its agenda.
The Court created the doctrine of tribal immunity, and that act of
creation confers interpretive and decisional obligations on the Court
until such time as Congress acts to appropriate control over the doctrine for itself.
IT. FEDERAL STATUTES AND REGULATIONS

A. Americans with Disabilities Act
Asymptomatic HIV. - Congress enacted the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)1 to provide enforceable federal standards designed
to eliminate discrimination against the disabled. 2 Rather than cataloguing the disabilities covered by the Act,3 Congress instead defined
"disability" as a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits a major life activity, a record of such an impairment, or being "regarded as having" such an impairment.4 Notwithstanding this definition, however, a health-care provider may still refuse to treat a patient
69 The Court has held that there is a strong presumption against preemption of state power.
See, e.g., Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 523 (1992) ("[The Court] must fairly but

in light of the strong presumption against pre-emption - narrowly construe the precise language of [the statute] and ... look to each of petitioner's common-law claims to determine
whether it is in fact pre-empted.").
70 The Court's decision does not make sense as a clear statement rule because the presumption
behind the decision is not clear - the holding does not clarify whether, or in what way, suits pertaining to off-reservation commercial activities are different from those pertaining to taxation and
regulation. The Court's apparent strategy - leaving a doctrinal area murky to force Congress to
-

legislate - is inappropriate to a doctrine born in and developed exclusively by the courts.
1 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994).

2 See id. § 121oi(b)(I)-(2).
3 Congress did catalogue those disabilities not covered under the ADA. See, e.g., id. § 1220
(illegal use of drugs); id. § 1221i(a) (homosexuality and bisexuality); id. § 122 ii(b)(2) ("compulsive
gambling, kleptomania, or pyromania").
4 Id. § 12102(2)(A), (B), (C) [hereinafter the "actual disability," "record of," and "regarded as"
prongs respectively].
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if he poses a "direct threat to the health or safety of others. '5 Lower
courts have divided over whether the asymptomatic stage of Human
Immunodeficiency Virus infection ("asymptomatic HIV")6 constitutes a
"disability,"7 and if so, whether it represents a "direct threat" to the
health or safety of health-care workers.8 Last Term, in Bragdon v. Abbott,9 the Supreme Court held that asymptomatic HIV was a disability
under the ADA and remanded the case to determine whether asymptomatic HIV poses a "significant" threat to health or safety.10 Although Bragdon resolved the circuit split over the classification of
asymptomatic HIV as a disability, the Court failed to address the different standards used in lower court cases involving HIV-infected patients and cases concerning HIV-infected health-care workers. This
failure leaves these workers in the curious position of being required to
treat HIV-infected patients while they are themselves unprotected
from employment discrimination should they contract HIV from their
patients.
In 1994, Sidney Abbott, who was HIV-positive but asymptomatic,11
went to Dr. Randon Bragdon's dental office for a scheduled appointment. 12

After Abbott disclosed her HIV infection,1 3 Bragdon exam-

ined her teeth and diagnosed a cavity.14 Bragdon refused to fill Abbott's cavity in his office but offered do so in a hospital,1 5 at no extra
charge, although Abbott would have to pay the hospital to use its 17facilities.' 6 Abbott refused Bragdon's offer and filed suit against him.

5 Id. § 12 182(b)( 3 ) (indicating that a "direct threat" is a significant risk "that cannot be eliminated by a modification of policies, practices, or procedures or by the provision of auxiliary aids
or services").
6 Asymptomatic HIV refers to the period during which an HIV-infected individual has not

yet developed the symptoms associated with HIV. See Yunzhen Cao et al., Virologic and Immu-

nologic Characterizationof Long-Term Survivors of Human Immunodeficiency Virus Type i Infection, 332 NEw ENG. J. MED. 201, 201 (1995).
7 Compare Abbott v. Bragdon, 1O7 F.3d 934, 939-43 (ist Cir. 1997) (holding that asymptomatic HIV is a disability under the "actual disability" prong), with Runnebaum v. Nationsbank of
Md., 123 F 3d 156, 167-74 (4th Cir. I097) (en banc) (holding that asymptomatic HIV is not a disability under either the "actual disability" or "regarded as" prongs).
8 See Abbott, 107 F 3d at 943-49.
9 118 S. Ct. 2196 (1998).
10 See id. at 2213.

See id. at 2200-01.
See id. at 2201.
13 See id.
11
12

14 See Abbott v. Bragdon, 912 F. Supp. 580, 584 (D. Me. 1995).
15 See id. Bragdon was concerned "that the use of high-speed drills and surface cooling with
water created a risk of airborne HIV transmission," and that the availability of "air filtration, ultraviolet lights, respirators, and other safety measures [in the hospital] would reduce the risk."
Bragdon, 118 S. Ct. at 2211-12.
16 See Bragdon, 118 S.Ct. at 22oi. The cost of using the hospital facilities would have been
approximately $I65. See John Gibeaut, Filling a Need, 83 A.B.A. J. 48, 50 (July 1997).
17 See Abbott, 912 F. Supp. at 583-84.
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The trial court held that Abbott was "disabled" under the actual
disability prong of the ADA, concluding that asymptomatic HIV substantially limited the major life activity of reproduction. 18 Consequently, the court required Bragdon to treat Abbott in his office because the increased risk to Bragdon from performing the procedure
there instead of at the hospital was not significant enough to invoke
the "direct threat" exception.' 9 In assessing the significance of the risk,
the trial court purported to follow School Board v. Arline20 by "defer[ring] to the reasonable medical judgment of public health officials." 2 1 Because Bragdon, unlike Abbott, failed to buttress his position with judgments from public health officials, 22 the district court
show a "direct threat" and granted
found that Bragdon could not
23
summary judgment for Abbott.
The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed. 24 The appeals court held that asymptomatic HIV was a
"physical impairment" under the "actual disability" prong 2s of the
Act. 26 The court next relied on the "plain meaning" of the word "major, '27 prior legislative use of the phrase "major life activities," 28 and

the regulations promulgating the ADA, 29 to conclude that reproduction
was a major life activity under the ADA.30 The appeals court then
concluded that the limitation that asymptomatic HIV places on the
major life activity of reproduction is "substantial." 3 1
The First Circuit framed the "direct threat" question as whether
Bragdon had "the right to deny entirely routine dental treatment to pa-

lsSee id. at 585-87.
19 See id. at 587-91.
20 480 U.S. 273 (1987).
21

Abbott, 912 F. Supp. at 589.

22
23

See id. at 588-89.
See id. at 591, 595.

24

See Abbott v. Bragdon, r07 F.3d 934, 949 (ist Cir. r997).

See id. at 938-39. Under the "actual disability" prong, the plaintiff must prove that she has
a physical impairment, that the impairment limits a "major life activity," and that this limitation
is substantial. See id. The appeals court declined to consider whether Abbott was also disabled
under the "regarded as" prong. See id. at 938 n.2.
26 See id. at 939.
27 See id. at 939-40. The First Circuit's review of dictionary definitions led it to conclude that
"the touchstone for determining an activity's inclusion under the statutory rubric is its significance." Id. at 940 (emphasis added).
28 Id. at 940.
29 See id. (reasoning that because the regulations define "physical impairment" to include reproductive disorders, reproduction must itself be considered a major life activity) (citing 28 C.F.R.
§ 36.104 (1996)).
30 See id. at 941. The appeals court rejected Bragdon's argument that Abbott had to make a
specific showing that reproduction was a major life activityfor her. See id. at 942.
31 See id. at 942-43 (discussing the risks that Abbott would pass HIV to her child and that she
would not live long enough to raise a child to adulthood).
25
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tients with HIV. '32 The court of appeals rejected a rule of "absolute
capitulation" to the views of public health authorities, and instead favored a rule assigning their views "prima facie force, '33 but providing
for their rebuttal "by persuasive evidence adduced from other recognized experts in a given field."34 The appeals court also maintained
that one could not "prove or disprove the direct threat defense by relying on medical evidence not available when treatment was refused. '35 Applying this standard, the First Circuit concluded that
Bragdon's proffered evidence failed to rebut the presumption, created
by Abbott's evidence, that filling the cavities of an HIV-positive patient at an office does not pose a "direct threat" to the attending dentist's health. 3 6 The appeals court opined that "a service provider ...
can rely upon the direct threat defense only in response to significant
risks," and distinguished cases upholding discharges of HIV-infected
health-care workers on the ground that "any risk at all to patients is
deemed unacceptable." 37
38
In a 5-4 decision, a fragmented Supreme Court affirmed in part,
but a unanimous Court vacated and remanded the judgment.3

Kennedy 40

9

Writ-

held that asymptomatic HIV is a
ing for the Court, Justice
and remanded on the question
and
vacated
ADA,
the
disability under
was
sufficient to invoke the "dievidence
proffered
Bragdon's
whether
4 1 Justice Kennedy analyzed the "disability"
provision.
rect threat"
question under the "actual disability" prong.4 2 Justice Kennedy first
remarked that the ADA provides at least as much protection as do the
Rehabilitation Act 4 3 and its implementing regulations, 44 which state,

inter alia, that disorders affecting the hemic and lymphatic systems are
physical impairments. 45 Justice Kennedy reasoned that the disease at
every stage constitutes a "physical impairment" because of the imme32 Id. at 943 n.4. Because Bragdon characterized the offer as "gratuitous," the appeals court
found it "legally irrelevant" that Bragdon offered to treat Abbott in a hospital and thus left open
"whether it is illegal under the ADA for dentists to take additional precautions when treating

HIV-infected patients." Id.
Id. at 944-45.
Id. at 945.
Id. at 944.
Id. at 948.
Id. (emphasis added).
See Bragdon, 118 S. Ct. at 2213.
See id.; id. at 2216 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part); id. at 22 18 (O'Connor, J.,concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) It is
unclear whether the Chief Justice wanted to vacate and remand, or only to vacate. See id. at
22 16 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
40 Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer joined Justice Kennedy's opinion.
41 See Bragdon, i18 S. Ct. at 2213.
42 See id. at 2201.
43 29 U.S.C. §§ 7o6, 791, 793, 794a (1994).
44 See Bragdon, 118 S. Ct. at 2202 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 122oi(a)).
45 See id. (quoting 45 C.F.R. § 8 4 .3 (j)(2)(i) (1997)).
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
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diate and constant harm it imposes on these systems. 4 6 Relying on the
First Circuit's definition of "major, '4 7 Justice Kennedy concluded that
reproduction qualifies as an ADA-triggering "major life activity"4 that
the HIV virus substantially limits because of the risk of infection to
one's partner and child. 49 Justice Kennedy punctuated his argument
by noting that courts and administrative agencies have uniformly held
asymptomatic HIV to be a disability under the Rehabilitation Act of
1973, which also used the phrase "major life activity."5 0
Justice Kennedy next addressed the "direct threat" question. In
weighing the evidence, the Court held that the views of public health
officials possess "special weight and authority" but can be rebutted by
"citing a credible scientific basis for deviating from the accepted
norm."''5 Justice Kennedy concluded that the court of appeals had
erred in its weighing of three key pieces of evidence: the Court rejected
the First Circuit's conclusion that compliance with the precautions
prescribed by the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) reduced the risk
of HIV infection for health-care workers to an acceptable level; impeached the credibility of the i99i American Dental Association Policy
on HIV by terming it a professional organization's pronouncement on
ethical duties rather than an objective risk assessment; and expressed
concern that some of the information about the safety of in-office
treatment of HIV-positive dental patients became available only after
the incident at issue.5 2 Accordingly, Justice Kennedy concluded that
the proper course was to vacate and remand the case to the court of
appeals to reconsider this evidence.5 3
Justice Stevens, who joined in Justice Kennedy's opinion, wrote a
separate concurrence.5 4 Justice Stevens thought it unnecessary to remand because he considered the court of appeals's opinion to be perfectly consistent with the standard set forth in Justice Kennedy's
opinion, and because the evidence proffered by Bragdon was insufficient to withstand a motion for summary judgment. 5 Nonetheless, he
joined Justice Kennedy's opinion to ensure that there would be a ma46 Id. at 2204.
47 See supra note 27.

48 Bragdon, i18 S.Ct. at 2205. Justice Kennedy admitted that HIV infection might affect
other "major life activities," but limited his discussion to reproduction because this was the way in
which the issue had been considered by the lower courts and certified for review. See id. at 220405.

49 See id. at 2206.
50 Id. at 2207-09 ("[R]epetition of [language from an existing statute] in a new statute indicates, as a general matter, the intent to incorporate its administrative and judicial interpretations
as well.").
51 Id. at 2211.
52 See id. at 2211-12.

S3 See id. at 2213.
54 Justice Breyer joined in Justice Stevens's opinion.
S5 See Bragdon, i18 S. Ct. at 2213 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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jority for the opinion whose legal reasoning he found most accept6
able.5
Justice Ginsburg, who joined in Justice Kennedy's opinion, also
wrote a separate concurrence. Justice Ginsburg strongly supported the
remand, emphasizing the importance of the decision to health-care
workers and noting that if the courts are to err on this issue, they
57
should do so "on the side of caution."
Chief Justice Rehnquist concurred in the judgment in part and dissented in part.5 8 In his view, reproduction was not a "major life activity" because it was different in kind from the illustrative list of activities in the Rehabilitation Act regulations.5 9 The Chief Justice also
contested the majority's equation of "major" with "important," conceding that reproduction was "important" to one's life, but noting that
"so are decisions" regarding whom "to marry, where to live," and
which career to pursue. 60 The Chief Justice asserted that "importance
... is not the common thread linking the statute's listed activities," but
"rather [the thread is] that the activities are repetitively performed and
essential in the day-to-day existence of a normally functioning individual. '6 1 The Chief Justice found that, even assuming that reproduction
was a major life activity, HIV did not place a substantial limit on reproduction because individuals infected with HIV are physically "able
to engage in sexual intercourse, give birth to a child," and rear a
child. 62 In addition, the Chief Justice contended that the ADA requires individualized inquiries and noted that there was no evidence
that, absent her infection with HIV, Abbott would have even consid63
ered having children.
The Chief Justice then addressed the "direct threat" question. He
took issue with the "special weight and authority" accorded to the
See id.
Id. at 2214 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
58 Justices Scalia and Thomas joined Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion in full, and Justice
O'Connor joined his opinion in part.
59 See Bragdon, 1i8 S. Ct. at 2215 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part) (listing "caring for one's self, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working" as illustrated activities (quoting 45 C.ER.
§ 84.3(j)(2)(ii) (I997)).
60 Id.
61 Id.
62 Id. at 2215-16. In Chief Justice Rehnquist's view, the plaintiff's argument that the mother
will not live long enough to see her child to adulthood, "taken to its logical extreme, would render
every individual with a genetic marker for some debilitating disease 'disabled' here and now because of some possible future effects." Id. at 22 16. In a separate opinion, Justice O'Connor indicated that she would have refrained from addressing whether HIV status imposes a substantial
limitation on the ability to reproduce and would have avoided discussion of other aspects of intimate relations not raised in the case. See id. at 2217-18 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
63 See id. at 2214-15 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
56
57
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views of public health authorities and contended that the credentials of
the scientists and the soundness of their studies "must stand on their
own, '64 Applying this standard, the Chief Justice concluded that
Bragdon's introduction of the CDC report documenting seven possible
transmissions of HIV to dental workers and forty-two known incidents
of transmission to 65health-care workers was sufficient to withstand
summary judgment.
One could criticize the Court for "awkwardly and artificially
stretch[ing] the definition of the phrase 'substantially limits one or
more of the major life activities' to the limits of credibility" 66 by analyzing the issue under-the "actual disability" prong, which may expo67
nentially increase the number of conditions brought.under the ADA.
6
The result, however, is consistent with congressional understanding
and gives those allegedly discriminated against because of their HIV
status their day in court. 69 Moreover, the result would undoubtedly
have been the same -

indeed broader -

if analyzed under the "re-

which protects persons who
garded as" prong of the ADA definition,
70
are perceived as having a disability.
Far more troubling, though, is the Bragdon Court's failure to address the different standards used in lower court cases involving HIVinfected patients and in those cases involving HIV-infected health-care
providers. Left undisturbed, these cases stand for the proposition that,
under the ADA, an HIV-positive patient has the right to be treated by
64 Id. at 2217.

65 See id.
66 Elizabeth C. Chambers, Asymptomatic HIV as a Disability Under the Americans with DisabilitiesAct, 73 WASH. L. REV. 403,419 (i998).
67 Already, lower courts have relied on Bragdon to expand the ADA's scope. See, e.g., Erjavac
v. Holy Family Health Plus, No. 9 7C 1107, i998 WL 4005oo, at *9-*i (N.D. Ill. July 13, i998)
(relying on Bragdon to conclude that treated diabetes is a disability because an individual taking
insulin must eat particular foods and must urinate frequently, thereby affecting the "major" activities of eating and waste elimination); Gabriel v. City of Chicago, No. 96 C 7123, i998 WL 386156,
at *5-*8 (N.D. fIl. July 7, 1998) (relying on Bragdon'sconclusion that reproduction is a major life
activity to conclude that abnormal pregnancy is a disability).
68 See, e.g., 136 CONG. REc. H4623 (daily ed. July 12, i9go) (statement of Rep. Owens) ("[T]he
ADA will offer critical protection to people.., along the full spectrum of HIV infection - asymptomatic HIV infection, symptomatic HIV infection or full-blown AIDS. These individuals are
covered under thefirst prong of the definition of disability." (emphasis added)); 236 CONG. REC.
H2626 (daily ed. May 22, i9go) (statement of Rep. McDermott) ("[]ndividuals who have ...
asymptomatic HIV infection ... are covered under the first prong of the definition of disability."
(emphasis added)).
69 See, e.g., Disanto v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., No. 97-1090, 2998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12382, at *io
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. ii, 2998) (post-Bragdon case refusing to dismiss claim of employment discrimination against employee with asymptomatic HIV).
70 For a thorough analysis of asymptomatic HIV under the "regarded as" prong, see Chambers, cited above in note 66, at 423, who argues that courts have erred in analyzing the question
under the "actual disability" prong because this analysis would exclude those with HIV, such as
children, post-menopausal women, and celibate monks, who do not, or cannot, engage in reproduction.
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a provider if the risk to the provider is not "significant"; if that pro-

vider becomes infected with HIV as a result of providing the treatment, however, the provider's employer is entitled to fire him, even if
the risk that he will transmit HIV to patients is equal to or less than
the "insignificant" risk that he would contract HIV from a patient in
the first place. 7 1 Such an anomalous construction of the ADA is both
contrary to the statute's plain language and legislative history, and is
logically unsustainable.
At trial, Dr. Bragdon cited a line of cases in which courts have held
that firing or reassigning health-care workers infected with HIV does
not constitute discrimination under Title I of the ADA or under the
comparable standards of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of
1973.72 These cases held that although the actual risk of a patient contracting HIV from a provider may be quite low, the overall risk is unacceptable because the consequences of contracting HIV are so catastrophic.7 3 However, the trial court found these cases "inapposite" and
asserted that "[t]he health care provider-patient relationship ... is not

symmetrical. '74 In distinguishing these cases, the trial court focused
on statements in the opinions that sounded more in medical ethics
than in law 75 and for which those courts provided no support. 76 From
these unsupported opinions, the trial court drew its own unsupported
conclusion that the health-care worker and the patient are not similarly situated because only the health-care worker can control the level
of risk by deciding the extent to which he will comply with recommended precautions. 77 The court of appeals did not rely only on this
asymmetry-of-control-of-risk-reduction rationale to distinguish the
cases, but also on the more remarkable ground that there is no need to
71 Indeed, this anomalous result may already have occurred. See Doe v. University of Md.
Med. Sys. Corp., 5o F.3 d 1261, 1262, 1266 (4th Cir. 1995) (upholding the dismissal of a neurosurgery resident who tested positive for HIV after having been stuck with a needle while treating
someone who may have been HIV-positive).
72 See Abbott v. Bragdon, 912 F. Supp. 580, 589 (D. Me. 1995). The trial court erroneously
referred to these cases as addressing discrimination under Title III of the ADA. See id.
73 See, e.g., University of Md. Med. Sys. Corp., 5o F.3d at 1262, 1266; Mauro v. Borgess Med.
Ctr., 886 F. Supp. 1349, 1353-55 (W.D. Mich. 1995), aff'd sub nom. Estate of Mauro v. Borgess
Med. Ctr., 137 F.3 d 398, 398 (6th Cir. 1998) (upholding the dismissal of a surgical technician after
hospital officials became aware that he may have been infected with HIV); Doe v. Washington
Univ., 78o F. Supp. 628, 633-35 (E.D. Mo. 199i) (upholding a university committee's disenrollment of an HIV-positive dental student).
74 Abbott, 912 F. Supp. at 590.
75 Indeed, reliance on an assessment of ethical duties rather than on an objective assessment of
the risks involved runs contrary to Justice Kennedy's opinion in Bragdon. See Bragdon, i8 S.

Ct. at 2211-12.
76 See, e.g., Mauro, 886 F. Supp. at 1353 (agreeing with the defendant's claim that exposing
patients to a risk of acquiring fatal disease is "fundamentally inconsistent" with the mission of
patient care); Washington Univ., 780 F. Supp. at 633 ("It is the stated goal of the medical profession to heal, and its secondary axiom, if healing is not possible, is not to harm.").
77 See Abbott, 912 F. Supp. at 590.
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determine how high the risk is when the provider is infected with HIV
because "any risk at all to patients is deemed unacceptable."78 At oral
argument before the Supreme Court, Bragdon's attorney argued that
the holdings in these "reverse cases," coupled with the fact "that it's
easier to transmit HIV from a patient to a doctor than it is from a doctor to a patient," compelled the conclusion that providers are not required by the ADA to put themselves at risk of contracting HIV.79
Unfortunately, the Court failed to confront this issue.
The plain language of the statutory provisions suggests that the
lower courts' distinction is contrary to congressional intent. Title I of
the ADA provides employers with a defense to a charge of discrimination when the employer imposes "a requirement that an individual
shall not pose a direct threat to the health or safety of other individuals in the workplace,"8 0 with the term "direct threat" defined as "a significant risk to the health or safety of others that cannot be eliminated
by reasonable accommodation." ' Title Tf of the ADA provides that
"[nothing] in [Title II] shall require an entity to permit an individual
to participate in ... services ... of such entity where such individual
poses a direct threat to the health or safety of others," with the term
"direct threat" defined as "a significant risk to the health or safety of
others that cannot be eliminated by a modification of policies, prac8 s2
tices, or procedures or by the provision of auxiliary aids or services.
Thus, both titles provide a defense under the same circumstances title indicates that the stanwhen the risk is significant - and neither
8 3
dard differs in the health-care setting.
In addition to the statute's plain language, the congressional reports and floor debates assuage any doubt that the same standard
should be applied in both the employment and public accommodations
settings. Congressional reports outlining the provisions of the ADA
explain that the "direct threat" provision under Title HI "is identical to
one added in the employment section, and the discussion of this issue
there applies here as well." 4 Moreover, nothing in the legislative his-

78 Abbott v. Bragdon, 107 F.3d 943, 948 (ist Cir. 1997) (emphasis added).
79 Transcript of Oral Argument, Bragdon, ii8 S. Ct 2196 (1998) (No. 97-156), available in
1998 WL 141165, at *52-*53 (Mar. 30, 1998).
go 42 U.S.C. § 1211 3 (b) ('994).
81 Id. § 121I1(3) (emphasis added).
82 Id. § 12I82(b)(3) (emphasis added).
83 Title I covers virtually all employers with i5 or more employees. See id. § 12111(5).

III specifically includes hospitals and professional offices of health-care providers.

Title
See id.

§ 1218I(7)(F).
84 H.R. REP. No. ioI-485 (I[), at 62 (199o), reprintedin 199o U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 485 (emphasis added); see also 136 CONG. REc. E1918 (daily ed. June 13, 19go) (statement of Rep. Hoyer)

("This provision is analogous to one added in the employment title.").
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tory suggests that 5the standard is different or asymmetric in the
8
health-care setting.
Maintaining different standards for patient-to-provider transmission and provider-to-patient transmission is also logically unsustainable. For example, if a provider complies with the requirement that he
treat an infected patient when there is some risk, albeit not a legally
"significant" one, he necessarily violates the standard that he must not
expose his other patients to any risk of contracting HIV from him, because by treating the HIV-infected patient, he clearly exposes himself
to some risk of contracting HIV.
Using different standards also makes little sense from a policy
standpoint. It would be an odd antidiscrimination statute that outlaws
discrimination against HIV-infected persons in general, but leaves
health-care providers, who put themselves at great personal risk to
serve the statutory goal of antidiscrimination, unprotected from employment discrimination should they contract HIV by caring for HIVinfected patients. A cynic might suggest that the reason for this discrepancy is that society "feels good" about treating HIV-infected persons equally under the law, as long as someone else bears the risk.
One might question the nobility of America's antidiscrimination goals
were this an accurate interpretation of congressional - and societal intent. The courts ought not assume such an ignoble purpose, particularly when faced with substantial evidence to the contrary. Hopefully, the Court declined to address the "direct threat" standard for
HIV-infected health-care providers merely because that issue was not
squarely presented to the Court, and will, when directly confronted
with that question, extend the Bragdon rationale to the employment
setting.
Although not addressing the "reverse cases" directly, Justice Ginsburg's brief concurrence may provide the clearest and most sensible
standard for lower courts to use in applying the "direct threat" provision. Recognizing both the 1-IV-infected person's "need ... to obtain
health care" and "the 'importance [of the issue] to health care workers,"' Justice Ginsburg determined that the wisest course would be to
remand for a fully informed determination of risk, "erring, ifat all, on
the side of caution. '8 6 Under this standard, antidiscrimination would
remain the underlying goal, but unresolved scientific questions would
appear to be resolved in favor of the uninfected person. Presumably,
this same standard would apply whether the infected person was a pa85 See, e.g., 136 CONG. REC. H5885-86 (daily ed. July 30, I9go) (statement of Rep. Burton)
(noting that under the ADA, if an HIV-positive health-care worker is prevented from "taking care
of patients' wounds ... , that hospital or the doctor that moved [the patients] ... can be held liable, even though there is definitely a risk" (emphasis added)).

86 Bragdon, 118 S. Ct. at 2214 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (second alteration in original) (emphasis added) (quoting Bragdon, 118 S. Ct. at 2213).
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tient or a provider, and if so, would harmonize Bragdon with the "reverse cases."
Moreover, given that "[n]either Congress nor the Supreme Court
has informed us what the norm is" in determining whether a given
level of risk is significant or not,87 it is questionable whether it is ever
appropriate to grant summary judgment when, as in Bragdon, reasonable minds could differ. In Bragdon, the Justices differed substantially
on whether the risk was significant,88 but none of them explained what
a "significant" risk is, which implies that they only "know it when
[they] see it." 8 9

Without a clear and uniform standard, trial court

judges finding no significant risk as a matter of law will undoubtedly
be relying more on their own personal perspectives than on articulated
legal standards. When, as here, the question can literally be one of life
and death, defendants are entitled to the collective perspectives of a
jury of their peers rather than the views of a single person - especially if personal perspectives rather than legal standards are being
used.
The Court's decision in Bragdon ensures that individuals at all
stages of HIV infection are protected against discrimination. However,
the Court's failure to confront the lower courts' double standard for
dealing with HIV infection in the health-care setting leaves the nation
in the curious position of having an antidiscrimination statute that declares all individuals with HIV to be equal under the law, but with
some "more equal than others." 90
B. Antitrust
Vertical Maximum Price Fixing. - For several years, courts and
commentators have been tolling the death knell of the per se rule
against vertical maximum price fixing,' which had been in place since
the Supreme Court's 1968 decision in Albrecht v. Herald Co.2 Indeed,
the Supreme Court itself has been chipping away at this prohibition
87 Estate of Mauro v. Borgess Med. Ctr., 137 F.3d 398, 410-li (6th Cir. 1998) (Boggs, J., dissenting).
88 Compare Bragdon, ii8 S. CL at 2213 (Stevens, 3., concurring) (finding the risk too insignificant to withstand summary judgment), with id. at 2217 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) ("At a minimum, petitioner's evidence was sufficient to create
a triable issue.").
39 Jacobellis v. State of Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
90 GEORGE ORWELL, ANIMAL FARM 133 (Signet 1996) (1946) ('ALL ANIMALS ARE
EQUAL BUT SOME ANIMALS ARE MORE EQUAL THAN OTHERS").

I See, e.g., Jack Walters & Sons Corp. v. Morton Bldg., Inc., 737 F.2d 698, 707 (7 th Cir. 1984);
Frank H. Easterbrook, Maximum Price Fixing, 48 U. CHI. L. REv. 886, 89o & n.i9 (i98i). "Vertical maximum price fixing," or "maximum resale price maintenance," refers to an agreement between actors at different market levels - usually manufacturers or suppliers and distributors or
retailers - to fix a price above which the manufacturer's product may not be sold to consumers.
2 390 U.S. 145 (1968).

